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ARGUMENT
Appellants have structured the arguments presented herein, m reply to the arguments
presented by Respondents, as identified and outlined in the Brief submitted by these Respondents.
1. Did the trial court properly awarded attorney's fees to TVS pursuant to §12-121,
Idaho Code, as argued by Respondents.

The Respondents, Treasure Valley Seed Company, LLC (hereafter TVS), and Don Tolmie
have submitted their combined Responsive Briefs, therein arguing the District Court has not abused
its discretion when having orally announced the award of attorney fees and costs to Respondents,
on the basis of §12-121, Idaho Code, (See Resp. Brief, pg 10-18; Argument, Par. 2, pg 10;
Argument, Par. A, pg 11-12; Argument, Par. B, pg 13-16; Argument Par. C, pg 16-18) .
The Appellant would submit that the district court award of attorney fees and costs to
Defendants-Respondents constitutes a continuation of the result of the on-going abuse of discretion
that began with the wrongful dismissal of the Complaint, which pleading should not have been
dismissed by the Court, but instead should have allowed to be amended, as requested by PlaintiffAppellant, through counsel, to correct the caption of the case to continue the prosecution of the case
by a substitution of the real party in interest.
The case was initiated with the form caption that named the parties in that controversy in the
manner in which the original transaction was entered into with TVS and Mr. Tolmie, as entered into
by Vernon K. Smith, and it was through that authority and capacity at that time when Vernon K.
Smith entered into the agreement that was being utilized, and the parties were so identified in the
Complaint. Hence the Court expressed its reservation about going forward in that format, because of
the demise of Victoria H. Smith, giving rise to the need to address an appropriate amendment that
the rules of civil procedure are specifically designed to be allowed to be made, and a request was
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made for that purpose, as all rights and interests of Victoria H. Smith were capable of identification
and representation by either VHS Properties, LLC, where such rights and interests had been
transferred on July 4, 2012, managed entirely by Vernon K. Smith, and he was also identified as the
sole heir to the last will and testament of Victoria H. Smith, who became deceased on September
11, 2013. Clearly, an amendment in one form or another, either by the establishment of an estate, if
that be required, or a substitution of Mr. Smith (who inherited all rights), or substitution with VHS
Properties, LLC (to whom interests had been assigned) could have been made, to thereby remove
any dispute as to the proper party of interest, but the district court declined to take up the
opportunity of amendment, as a court pursuant to Rules 15, 17, and 20, IRCP is required to do, and
elected not to allow any amendment to the pleadings and dismissing the case, thereby committing
the initial abuse of discretion, and the subsequent award of attorney fees is a continuation of that
initial abuse, with the furtherance of an award of attorney fees under §12-121, Idaho Code, now
being the subject of this appeal.
An applicable analysis that relates to this unfortunate sequence of events is brought to our
attention from the analysis addressed in a case that alludes to this very subject matter, dealing
with death of a party later identified in the caption, the subject of amendments, and purpose of
allowing liberal pleadings, as set forth in the matter of Trimble v. Engelking, 130 Idaho 300, 939
P .2d 13 79 ( 1997), wherein the "nullity Rule" was discussed in detail, and the right to amend
pleadings is discussed and rationalized why such amendments in this situation are to be allowed,
as in context that would apply aptly to the circumstance of this controversy. In the Trimble case,
the complaint was dismissed by the Court, as the party defendant in that case was dead prior to
the filing of the complaint. The argument was made that a suit against a decedent is a nullity
because dead persons are not legal entities capable of being sued [or of suing]. This legal concept
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was described by the Appellate Court as a concept that is embraced in the rule known as the

nullity theory. Under the strict application of the nullity theory, a complaint naming or against a
decedent cannot be amended to add the decedent's estate [ in that case a defendant], because
there is nothing to amend, nor is there anything to which it can relate back; the original
complaint is therefore deemed to be a legal nullity, and the controversy or claim therefore never
existed. Such a strict application was addressed and analyzed from those other case across the
Country where that theory was found to have been applied, including such cases as, for example,

Bricker v. Borah, 127 Ill.App.3d 722, 82 Ill. Dec. 707, 469 N.E.2d 241 (1984); Mitchell v.
Money, 602 S.W.2d 687 (Ky.Ct.App.l 980); Mercer v. Morgan, 86 N.M. 711, 526 P.2d 1304
(App.1974), all of which reflected instances where the nullity theory had application and was
given the full effect of its sweeping implications. It was made patiently clear by our Idaho
jurisprudence, going back to1997, that the nullity theory and it devastating effects were not, and
would not become the law in Idaho, and the Trimble case took the specific opportunity to
announce to all Idaho jurists that Idaho does no adopt or apply the effects of the Nullity Rule,
and took the occasion to specifically state:

"Idaho has not adopted the nullity theory, and we see no good reason to do so now. The
nullity rule is a remnant of an earlier era of strict pleading requirements. Adopting such a rule,
and thereby precluding amendment and relation back where a party is improperly named, would
frustrate the purpose of our modern rules of pleading which seek to promote the resolution of
disputes on their merits rather than to bar suit based on antiquated pleading requirements. See
IR. C.P. I (a) ("These rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding. The courts can resolve more fairly problems
stemming from improperly named defendants by applying I.R.C.P. 15(c). We thus decline to
adopt the nullity rule in Idaho and hold that, where a party has been named improperly,
amendment and relation back should be allowed where the requirements ofl.R.C.P. 15(c) are
met ..... (emphasis, both italicized and dark, added)
In our case, a specific request was made to amend the Complaint to address the concerns
stemming from the death of Victoria H. Smith, and to satisfy any concerns regarding the
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pleading requirements necessary to provide the district court with a real party in interest, to be
accomplished in one of several ways. The Course of Proceedings set forth in both the original
Opening Brief, and in the subsequently Amended Opening Brief filed with the Court, has
demonstrated therein the manner in which an amendment was sought from the District Court.
The Complaint was filed December 13, 2013 (CL R. p. 5-19), naming Victoria H. Smith as
Plaintiff, initiated by and through her attorney in fact, Vernon K. Smith, through his durable and
irrevocable power of attorney, being the manner in which the agreement(s) with TVS and Mr.
Tolmie were entered into in 2007 and again in 2008, and it was thought appropriate to commence
the action reflecting that "capacity", thereby carrying forward into the pleadings that structure of
authority that created the relationship between the parties, all of which could be subject to any
needed amendment or substitution if it became an issue, and if thereafter required, as an estate had
not been opened, as the interests of Victoria H, Smith had been transferred to VHS Properties, LLC,
on July 4, 2012, as well as Mr. Smith having been declared the sole heir to inherit under his
Mother's Will, if there were any need for ever opening an estate. The pleadings in this case were
filed two days before the statute passed on the contractual transaction, and any amendment needed
was to be liberally granted by the district court, if the nature of the named relationships between the
parties were challenged within the pleadings, demanding substitution different from the parties in
the original transaction. The Answer, and Counterclaims filed by TVS (CL R. pp. 36-108), and the
Answer filed on behalf of Don Tolmie (CL R. pp. 109-114), did not ever asse1t any challenge to the
real party in interest, or raise concern over the death of Victoria H. Smith (a fact published in the
newspaper, in obituary listings, and of court record. There was no assertion that the pleadings failed
to name the "real party in interest", or whether the use of the power of attorney to file the action in
the first place was outside the scope of any valid agency or representative capacity to initiate suit
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under the name of Victoria H. Smith, who had died on September 11, 2013, three months before the
case was filed. The Defendants knew the original transaction with TVS had been negotiated and
entered into by Mr. Smith, in behalf of Victoria H. Smith, which had begun with the crop season to
grow lima beans in 2007 (with Mr. Tolmie being the designated field representative by TVS), and
Mr. Smith negotiated the settlement and sale of the lima beans, which included the use of the same
power of attorney with Don Tolmie, who was acting on behalf of TVS, which sale agreement was
concluded on December 15, 2008, all relevant activity that had transpired in the creation of the
agreement, and all relevant factors that gave rise to the cause of action, all of which had been
commenced and completed during the life of Victoria H. Smith, during an enforceable period of the
power of attorney, and it was in that "capacity: the contractual transaction was pursued, as that was
the way in which the facts had begun.
The District Court , during that Conference (held March 3, 2014), raised, sua sponte, the
demise of Victoria H. Smith, confirming with Plaintiffs counsel to the effect that she had died on
September 11, 2013, as the Court was aware, and the Court proposed the matter was subject to
Defendants' motion to dismiss, which Defendants then filed their Motion to Dismiss on March 18,
2014 (Cl. R. pp.143-149), and lodged their Memorandum March 18, 2014 (Cl. R. pp. 150-153).
The Memorandum (as identified in the Clerk's Record) was filed incomplete, but represents what
the Court had received to support Defendants' dismissal motion in the matter.
Plaintiffs counsel filed both an Objection To the Motion to Dismiss, and filed a Motion To
Substitute Parties on April 1, 2014 (Cl. R. pp.154-159), and filed a Motion For Joinder Of a Real
Party In Interest And Permissive Joinder Of Parties, Pursuant to Rules 17(a) and 20(a) JR.CP. on
April 1, 2014 (CL R. pp.160-162).
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On April 4, 2014, the District Court instead chose to merely dismiss the case, entering the
Order as entitled: Judgment Dismissing Case, and therein stating "the above case is dismissed
without prejudice, subject to the Court's retaining jurisdiction to rule on any timely filed request for
costs and attorney fees. IT IS SO ORDERED" (Cl. R. pp. 163-164).
With what this district Court chose to do, we would submit that in accordance with Trimble,
supra, that dismissal was an improper course of action taken by the district court, a clear violation of

the procedural rules that govern amendments to the pleadings, as the Trimble Court had so
previously declared to all jurists in Idaho:
"We interpret the district court's decision dismissing the complaint and denying Trimble's
motion to amend as based on the nullity theory, which we decline to adopt. It must therefore be
determined whether Trimble met the requirements of I.R.C.P. 15(c) for amendment of the
complaint and relation back to the date of the original filing. The decision to grant or deny a
party's motion to amend a pleading is left to the trial court's discretion, and we will not reverse
such a ruling absent an abuse of this discretion. Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606, 610, 570 P.2d
284, 288 (1977). While the court below did discuss Rule 15(c) in its decision, we conclude that it
did not fully explore its exercise of discretion under that Rule. We thus remand for a
consideration of whether Trimble has met the requirements of Rule 15(c).
The Trimble Court made clear the reasons why it had specifically declined to adopt the
devastating effects of the nullity theory, and re-affirmed the procedural purpose of the civil rules
of procedure when it came to amendments in Idaho, and stated that where a party has been
named improperly, an amendment and relation back shall be allowed where the requirements for
amendment are met. The appellate Court vacated the district court's order that dismissed
Trimble's complaint, and remanded the matter for determination whether amendment of the
complaint was appropriate, and in that case it included the Estate and relation back to the date of
the original filing that would be preserved.

The issue of the award of attorney fees and costs

raised in this appeal is inextricably intertwined with this wrongful dismissal of the Complaint by the
District Court, as that was not accomplished with any proper exercise of the elements required to
assess an amendment of the pleadings. The only reason for the dismissal was the district court's
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF- PAGE 10

determination there was a failure to have a real party in interest identified in the initial complaint,
and but for that inappropriate dismissal, the Defendants could not become regarded as being
declared by the district court as the "prevailing parties" as inappropriately determined by the district
court when it then elected to awarded attorney fees and costs under §12-121, Idaho Code. Absent
that dismissal, the matter would otherwise have proceeded upon the merits of the controversy. It is
appellants' position this Court must analyze the rationale of that dismissal, to determine what
becomes a discretionary abuse of the lower court that was allowed to evolve into the attorney fee
award, as it was the wrongful dismissal that formed the exclusive basis from which the
determination of fees and costs came into being, and has become the issue in this appeal.
When a dismissal of an action is reviewed by an appellate courts, that dismissal falls
under the criteria to determine if the proper application of procedural rules were followed, being
a matter of free review, as addressed in Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 450, 210 P.3d 552,
558 (2009) (quoting Blaser v. Cameron, 116 Idaho 453, 455, 776 P.2d 462, 464 (Ct. App.
1989) ). Appellants believe this Court must review the record to determine if the district court
abused its discretion with the judgment of dismissal, as that is the sole rationale for the very idea
of awarding attorney fees, and the determination and calculation of any award of attorney fees,
as that matter is a matter of court discretion as well Grease Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582,
586, 226 P.3d 524, 528 (2010) (citing I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3); Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423,
432, 196 P.3d 341, 350 (2008)), but it cannot be based upon stacking a series of abuses of a
court's discretion. The dismissal of the Complaint started the domino effect from which this
appeal has now been sculpted to address. When deciding whether a trial court has abused its
discretion, the standard is whether the court perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within
the outer boundaries of its discretion, and consistently, with the legal standards applicable to the
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF- PAGE 11

specific choices available to it, properly reached its decision by an exercise of reason. See Read

v. Harvey, 147 Idaho 364, 369, 209 P.3d 661, 666 (2009) (citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v.
Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)).

See In Idaho Military

Historical Society v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 329 P .3d 1072 (2014), the Court has consistently ruled
an award of attorney fees, pursuant to § 12-121 and LR. C.P. 54(e)(1 ), will not be disturbed, absent
an abuse of discretion. See Savage v. Lateral Ditch Water Users Ass'n v. Pulley, 125 Idaho 237,
250, 869 P.2d 554, 567 (1993). The determination whether an action was brought or defended
frivolously will not be disturbed, absent an abuse of discretion. See Anderson v. Ethington, l 03
Idaho 658, 660, 651 P.2d 923, 925 (1981). As repeatedly stated by the Court, when an exercise of
discretion is involved, the Appellate Court will conduct a three-step inquiry: (1) whether the trial
court properly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether that court acted within the outer
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific
choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by the exercise of reason. See Sun Valley

Shopping Center v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94,803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). 156 Idaho at
629,329 P.3d at 1077.
Appellant firmly believes this Court must ascertain what the lower court had based its
discretion upon, and the sole reasoning and basis is what was orally announced by the lower court
when deciding to award the fees, under that statute, because the Complaint did not contain the
correct real party in interest. The "discretion" addressed only the caption in the Complaint when
filed, and no other reasoning was considered by the court, and that discretion exercised by the
district court was to dismiss the Complaint, rather than to allow any form of amendment, as was
procedurally required by the rules, and the overwhelming concern becomes self-evident as the
district court did not analyze, in its exercise of its discretion, any reference to whether it was acting
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consistently with the legal standards applicable to specific choices before it under the civil rules

ofprocedure , being the perceived need to amend the Complaint, which is to be liberally allowed,

and whether the district court reached its decision to dismiss the Complaint by any exercise of
reason, when effectively denying a reasonable request to amend the caption in the case to establish
other real parties in interest, once the challenge was made, and especially when the law requires
amendments to be freely granted. The analysis of the lower courts abuse of discretion criteria starts
with the lower court's conduct regarding the dismissal itself, as that created the consequence of the
abusive award of fees and costs. The only glimpse we have to address the logic and reasoning of the
district court is that oratory announced that expressed its thoughts when orally granting the fee and
cost award, stating the district court's only logic, from which the fee award was solely based in the
first place:
But more fundamentally this is a case that should never have
been brought in the fashion that it was brought. It was not brought bv the
proper party. Victoria Smith is no longer with us. She cannot in-person or
through a power of attorney be a party to a court action. It's just pretty much
that simple and black letter law. This matter, if it is to be pursued on behalf of
Victoria Smith upon her passing, it needs to be pursued by the estate of
Victoria Smith. And that was never commenced, at least not as of the time this
case was brought. And at the time is was argued, Mr. Eismann represents that it
has not been - probate has not been started to this date. I don't know. That's not
in my record. I don't rely on that. I look at the case as it was at the time it was
terminated - or actually at the time it was commenced. (taken from portions
within the court's commentary as contained in Tr. Vol. I, pg. 31 L.15thru pg.
36, L. 8).

It has always been recognized that any award of attorney fees to any prevailing party under§
12-121, Idaho Code, is entirely discretionary, Webster v. Hoopes, 126 Idaho 96, 100, 878 P.2d
795, 799 (Ct.App.1994), and in this case, that discretion begins with the action that was taken by
the district court that brought about the situation that resulted in the occasion for the lower court
to exercise any discretionary disposition as to whether there is a prevailing party or not, and if
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF- PAGE 13

there is a valid and lawful basis, from the reasoning advanced, to exercise a discretionary basis to
aware fees and costs. In Ross v. Ross, 142 Idaho 536, 129 P.3d 1285 (Ct.App.2006), the Court
declared the following applicable standard for an award of attorney fees under§ 12-121, Idaho

Code, wherein the Court stated:
"[W]hen deciding whether the case was brought or defended frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation, the entire course of the litigation must be
taken into account. Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 434, 95
P.3d 34, 52 (2004); McGrew, 139 Idaho at 562, 82 P.3d at 844. If there is a
legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney fees may not be awarded under LC. § 12121 even though the losing party has asserted factual or legal claims that are
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Vendelin, 140 Idaho at 434, 95 P.3d
at 52; Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist., 135 Idaho at 524-25, 20 P.3d at 708-09. 142
Idaho at 539, 129 P.3d at 1288 (emphasis added). In other words, if there is at least
one legitimate issue presented in this case, attorney fees cannot be awarded under
J.C.§ 12-121 even though the losing party may have asserted other factual or legal
claims that are allegedly frivolous, unreasonable, or without adequate legal or
factual foundation. McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551,562, 82 P.3d 833, 844
(2003)."
Nowhere has this district court said the content of the case was frivolous at all. Our
district court recognized there was not a disposition upon the merits, and there was a legitimate
issue presented in the case, as recognized during the oral presentation on the issue on attorney

fees, wherein the highlighted commentary demonstrates that fact:
This case was brought without foundation. Idaho Code Section 12-121 says that
attorney's fees are awardable if the case is brought, pursued, or defended frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation. I won't go as far as to say the case is
frivolous because underlying it there appears to be a genuine dispute of some
variety that needs to be decided at some point by a proper forum or in a proper
forum. But it was certainly pursued in this case without foundation because
there is no foundation for commencing a lawsuit on behalf of someone who is
deceased other than doing it through the - as a properly-appointed personal
representative or otherwise authorized person. And a power of attorney simply
does not and cannot survive the death of the grantor. That's just so
fundamental that it is hard to find, even authority that says so.
I will award the attorney's fees. The costs requested are all costs as a matter of right.
The attorney's fees requested - or the costs requested will be awarded. And I'm
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going to award attorney's fees in this case under Idaho Code Section 12- 121 as a
lawsuit that was brought or pursued without foundation - unreasonably and without
foundation.
As an alternative I would award attorney's fees under 12-120(3), although I do not
think that reaches to counsel. I am not comfortable that the procedure required
by Rule 11, that is, the opportunity -- the notice and opportunity to withdraw a
pleading and get out from under the potential sanction was followed in this case.
Or if it was and my record was clear that it was followed, so at this time I'm
going to decline to award fees under Rule 11. But I will rule - award them
under 12-121 against the party and counsel because it's counsel's responsibility,
frankly, in a case like this to know the law and follow it. (taken from portions of
the court's commentary as contained in Tr. Vol. I, pg. 31 L. 15 thrupg. 36, L. 8.
The dispute with TVS was initiated over TVS's failure to pay the purchase price that
TVS had agreed to pay for the beans when it purchased them from Plaintiffs; not just a dispute
over storage of beans. The beans had been purchased by TVS (see allegations in Complaint), at a
price Mr. Tolmie agreed to buy them for, but Mr. Tolmie refused to reveal the contract upon
which he based that price he had represented and claimed he was able to sell them for, as Mr.
Tolmie had been deceiving Plaintiffs as to the price he was selling them for, as the agreement
with Mr. Tolmie was to assist Plaintiffs in recovery for the prior year's production losses, due to
Mr. Tolmie's failure to perform his field representative responsibilities he committed to do when
securing bean acreages under contract in 2007. Mr. Tolme was selling these lima beans for
substantially more than the representations he had made to Vernon K. Smith when Mr. Tolmie
committed to take possession of the beans and committed to the price he represented he was able
to pay Plaintiffs, based specifically upon his selling price, which he grossly misrepresented. Mr.
Tolmie has retained possession of the beans, has failed to pay for them as promised (in any
amount) and claims he has not converted them to his own use and benefit, yet has refused to
return the beans to Plaintiffs. There lies the merits of the case, none of which has been decided,
and "merits" were recognized to be a legitimate controversy, and not decided by the district
court.
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Despite the realization there was a legitimate controversy; the District Court did not
allow any amendment, finding instead there was no foundation to file the suit in the first
instance, nothing short of an abuse of discretion, when a reasonable remedy was available and
among the court's reasonable choices. Rather than allow any amendment to resolve the demised
party issue, and despite that specific request being made to the court, this district court instead
simply dismissed the action, because of the manner in which the parties were named originally
in the case as it was filed, and then gave an oral presentation upon the award of fees, upon the
Court's grant of the motion to dismiss, and expressed its belief there was no foundation to bring
the action, from which it found it would be appropriate to award fees upon the dismissal of the
action, as that dismissal made Defendants prevailing parties, despite no determination made upon
the merits, and that course of action, in effect, was a direct application of the nullity rule, as
opposed to considering the requirement to allow amendments to the pleadings, which must be
liberally allowed, though in our case, they were not allowed at all, and that lack of amendment
left the pleadings without a real party in interest, constituting the only basis to dismiss the
Complaint, as the district court elected to do. From Appellant's perspective the dismissal of the
Complaint was the result of an abuse of discretion by the Court, and the award of attorney fees
and cost was a continuation and extension of that on-going abuse of discretion.
In Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 106 Idaho 905, 684 P.2d 307 (Ct.App.1984) the
Court stated the standard (and thusly the standard of review) upon which an award of attorney
fees under§ 12-121, Idaho Code, are to be based:
A misperception of law or of one's interest under the law is not, by itself, unreasonable
conduct. If it were, virtually every case controlled by a question of law would entail an attorney
fee award against the losing party under LC.§ 12-121. Rather, the question must be whether the
position adopted by the owner was not only incorrect but so plainly fallacious that it could be
deemed frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. 106 Idaho at 911, 684 P .2d at 313. See
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also, Herbst v. Bothof Dairies, Inc., 110 Idaho 971, 975, 719 P.2d 1231, 1235 (Ct.App.1986)

("The standard for determining whether such an award should be made is not whether the
position urged by the nonprevailing party is ultimately found to be wrong, but whether it is so
plainly fallacious as to be frivolous."); and Gulf Chemical Employees Federal Credit Union v.
Williams, 107 Idaho 890,894,693 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Ct.App.1984) ("[A] claim is not necessarily
frivolous or lacking in merit simply because it ultimately fails as a matter of law. Rather, the
question is whether the claim when made and pursued, is so plainly fallacious that it can be
termed frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation."). (Emphasis added).
In Walker v. Boozer, 140 Idaho 451, 95 P.3d 69 (2004) the Court has stated:
"The district court cited I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) and LC. § 12-121 as the basis for awarding attorney
fees incurred by the Quaker Haven Owners in defending against the Boozers' Motion to Alter or
Amend the Judgment. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l), attorney fees may be granted under LC. §
12-121 only when a court finds from the facts presented to it, "that the case was brought,
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l)
(emphasis added). The denial of a motion does not fall within the scope of the authority cited
by the district court because a single motion does not comprise an entire case. In other words,
J.C. § 12-121 applies to cases as a whole and not to individual motions. See Turner v. Willis,
119 Idaho 1023, 1025, 812 P.2d 737, 739 (1991); Mgmt. Catalysts v. Turbo W Corpac, Inc., 119
Idaho 626, 630, 809 P.2d 487, 491 (1991); Magic Valley Radiology Assoc. P.A. v. Prof'! Bus.
Servs., Inc., 119 Idaho 558, 563, 808 P.2d 1303, 1308 (1991). Therefore, the award of attorney
fees is reversed because the authority cited by the district court does not support such an
award.140 Idaho at 457, 95 P.3d at 75 (emphasis added).
The facts in this case have not been brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or
without [factual] foundation. The lower court has so much as recognized that a factual dispute in
the controversy has merit, but instead focused upon the death of Victoria, and ended the case.
The district court mis-applied the fundament focus of what is established by case law, relative to
the application of the provisions of that statutory and procedural (IRCP) requirements as
announced in Rule 54(e)(2), IRCP, and as well established in case law. It's not the facts that are
being declared by the district court to be unfounded, but the identity of the named parties in the
suit when filed. The facts identified within the Complaint state a valid controversy, and create a
meritorious dispute, and the court has avoided any criticism as to the facts of the case, instead
the district court chose to criticize the absence of the real party in interest, due to the death of
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Victoria, which was readily and procedurally corrected by amendment to the named parties to be
identified in the case by the application of the civil rules of procedure.

2. Whether written findings were required for attorney's fees pursuant to §12-121,
Idaho Code.

As to the requirement for the district court to make specific written findings before any
award of attorney fees can be granted under §12-121, Idaho Code, as required by Rule 54(e)(2),
IRCP [another civil rule of procedure, just as are Rules 15, 17, & 20, IRCP] these Respondents
have expressed acknowledgment that this specific procedural requirement was ignored in this
case, despite being a procedural requirement specifically mandated under the rules of civil
procedure, and they admit procedural error has been committed with the district court's failure
to conduct that procedural requirement, but the Respondents want this Court to "create new
law" that allows the lower courts to ignore the rules of civil procedure, apparently as they would
endorse the lower court's conduct in ignoring the requirement of liberal allowance to requests to
amend pleadings, as was also ignored by the district court in this case. What remains significant
as to these procedural failures is that it represents what was taking place in this case with this
variety of procedural errors committed by the district court. as the court's obligation to allow
amendments to the pleadings is a procedural requirement as well.

Appellants' counsel, Vernon K. Smith, had moved the district court to allow an
amendment, pursuant to Rule 17(a) and 20(a), IR.C.P., as those Rules specifically provided for the
substitution of the Real Party in Interest, and those Rule(s) specifically provide that no action shall

be dismissed on the grounds that it is not prosecuted i11 the name of the Real Party in Interest,
until a reasonable time has been allowed, after obiectio11, for ratification ofcommenceme11t o{ihe
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action by, or ioinder or substitution of, the Real Party in Interest, and such ratification, ioinder,
or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the
Real Party in Interest from the inception. Rule 17(a) specifically provides:

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 17(a). Real Party in Interest.
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An executor,
administrator, personal representative, guardian, conservator, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a
party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a
party authorized by statute may sue in this capacity without joining the party for whose benefit
the action is brought; and when a statute of the state of Idaho so provides, an action for the use or
benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of Idaho. No action shall be
dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until
a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the
action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification,joinder,
or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of
the real party in interest. (Emphasis added)

Vernon K. Smith had a right to join in as a party in the case, both individually,
and/or in behalf of VHS Properties, LLC, and if deemed necessary by the Court, could have
proceeded with the formation of an estate as well, for joinder or substitution of all such options, as
allowed under Rule 20(a), I.R.C.P., which provides:

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 20(a). Permissive Joinder of Parties - Permissive
Joinder.
All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally,
or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in
the action. All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact
common to all of them will arise in the action. A plaintiff or defendant need not be interested
in obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded. Judgment may be given for one or
more of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief, and against one or more
defendants according to their respective liabilities.

By virtue of that Motion for Joinder, (CL R. pp. 160-162),

Mr. Smith specifically

requested the district court to enter an order allowing amendment of the pleadings to allow the
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permissive joinder of Vernon K. Smith, who held an interest and would be the sole heir to any
estate interests, was the member to VHS Properties, LLC, that could have advanced the interests
if deemed the preferred avenue of litigation among parties, and was entitled to join to advance
his own interests against TVS and Don Tolmie, in his individual capacity, or join the estate upon
the formation of an estate, if ruled necessary, where he then would continue in a representative
capacity to proceed as the personal representative, either way, he was entitled to pursuing the
action as among the Real Party in Interest, or could substitute the named party in the caption as a
real party in interest. Such a joinder and substitution was proper, pursuant to Rule 20(a), IRCP,
so the action could proceed without delay and not be dismissed, as Mr. Smith held an interest in
the beans as well as his Mother, and it was that agreement and his involvement that gave rise to
the subject matter of the litigation, and any interests held by Victoria H. Smith in the proceeds
from the sale of the beans were capable of being represented by VHS Properties, LLC or through
an estate, if required by the District Court, following his mother's demise on September 11,
2013.
The pleadings identified Victoria H. Smith as a Party Plaintiff, thereby having announced
and preserved her interests, though recognizing an estate could be opened, or VHS Properties
substituted, if challenged, pursuant to Rule 17(a) IRCP. as substitutions are contemplated to take
place, and here it was challenged, and the substitution and Joinder of the Party Plaintiff was
believed to resolve the objection being raised by Defendants, and the permissive joinder as the
Real Party in Interest should have been granted, and a reasonable time allowed to determine
whether to open an estate and pursue substitution with the estate, using that representative
capacity as the personal representative, or substitute in VHS Properties, LLC, representing its
interests through Mr. Smith as well, as he was a member thereof at the time the suit was filed.
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The Court had the authority, as well as the obligation, to allow the amendment, the
requested joinder and the requested substitution, or a reasonable time to determine the proper
party for substitution, and such leave must be freely given, as justice requires. Rule 15(a), IRCP,
specifically states:
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a). Amended and Supplemental Pleadings - I
Amendments.
A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a
responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is
permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may so amend it at
any time within twenty (20) days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend a pleading only
by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given
when justice so requires, and the court may make such order for the payment of costs as it
deems proper. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time remaining
for response to the original pleading or within ten ( I 0) days after service of the amended
pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
The district court ignored the obligation to freely allow amendments to the pleadings, as
the Rules require and mandate, and also ignored the procedural duty and obligation to render
written findings of fact, before any award of any attorney fees can be allowed under the

statutory provisions of §12-121, Idaho Code, as it is mandated by Rule 54(e)(2), IRCP.
This District Court, by these factors considered, has violated the civil rules, by its abuse of
discretion or apparent disregard of the rules of civil procedure, failing or refusing to allow for an
appropriate amendment to the pleadings, failing to allow the proper substitution and joinder of
rightful and proper party(s), or allow a reasonable opportunity to determine what appropriate
substitution needs to be made, so the case could proceed and a disposition made upon the merits,
not upon a motion to dismiss, based upon the sole challenge as to the real party in interest, when a

case has merit, stating a meritorious claim, demonstrating the case needed to proceed forward for a
determination upon the merits, as there could be no justice served by a dismissal, the effect of which
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would cause irreparable harm to the survival of the action and claims against the DefendantsRespondents.
The dismissal of the Complaint constitutes an abuse in the application of the Rules of
Procedure, just as the failure to make written findings as to the basis for attorney fees under §12-

121, Idaho Code, constitutes and abuse of a mandatory rule, and the lower court's actions serve to
have disregarded the purpose of the Rules cited above, and constitutes an abuse in both respects, as
the district court's failure to render writing findings, as was the failure to allow any amendment, is
an abuse or disregard of a what is a procedural right, duty, and reasonable expectation that
should take place in the course of such civil proceedings.
What now has become interesting is that Respondents have decided to ask this Court to
"create new case law", allowing an exception to written findings required by Rule 54(e)(2), IRCP

(See Resp. Brief, pg. 11, under Argument A.). That procedural rule of written findings was designed
to specifically identify the basis and reasons for such an attorney fee award, originally adopted and
made effective in 1979. It has been in effect 36 years, and it has not historically created any
insurmountable burden on lower courts to comply with such a rule. It would appear reasonable to
conclude it has served the courts well over the years, just as when contemplated by the Supreme
Court and when adopted in 1979. That requirement eliminates any mis-spoken thoughts, as could
result in any oral commentary, and there exists less chance of mis-speaking when written, reviewed,
signed and filed as a separate document with the Court, from which an appeal is then capable of
being taken upon its very content, and determine from that written dialogue the considerations that
were undertaken when electing to exercise and discretionary authority allowed and required in the
law. The actual procedural Rule provides:
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54( e )(2). Findings.
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Whenever the court awards attorney fees pursuant to section 12-121, Idaho Code, it shall
make a written finding, either in the award or in a separate document, as to the basis and
reasons for awarding such attorney fees.(Adopted January 2, 1979, effective March 1, 1979.)
(emphasis added)
If the request to "create new case law" on the subject were to be granted, when would it

be adopted? When would it take effect? Would it be adopted and go into effect retroactively,
intending to address this case only, and would it serve to overrule other cases that have relied
upon the requirement of written findings since 1979?

Those required written findings don't exist in our case, and if they did, they would better
confirm a reflection of what is perceived by Appellants as the abuse of discretion by the lower
court, starting with the violation of the Rules of Procedure on the subject of real party(s) in
interest, as that was the sole basis for the award by the contention these pleadings lacked the
correct party, no amendment will be allowed, and the nullity rule is adopted and applied by the
district court. When written findings are made, they must be supported by the record as
upholding the court's determination that the entire action was pursued frivolously. See Wait v.

Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 799, 41 P.3d 220, 227 (2001). Not only were no written
findings undertaken by the lower court, or proposed by counsel, or ever supplemented by an
amendment to the judgment award or in a separate supplemental document to create an amended
order to the case, but the entire action was not allowed to even come into being, because of the
refusal to allow the amendment of the pleadings to address the concern over the real party or
parties in interest, as the Court truncated the intent of the Procedural Rules that allow
amendments, substitutions, and joinders, and specifically abandoned the judicial duty to allow
amendments, that are to be freely given, especially when in the interests of justice, that will
achieve resolution upon the merits of the controversy, not prevent the entire action from going
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forward by a decision to dismiss the action, without affording the reasonable and necessary
opportunity to determine the proper means and method of substitution. The Defendants' counsel,
who drafted the "Judgment" that was to be entered on attorney fees and costs, could have asked
the Court for guidance as to the Court's basis and reasons to be included in the award, if
Defendants-Respondents were familiar with the requirement of the procedural rule. Obviously,
their counsel believed the Court's basis for such an award was under §12-121, Idaho Code, but
even that passing reference was stricken by the Court in the prepared "iudgment" presented to
the Court by Defendants.

3. Whether a person's misperception of law or of one's interest under the law, by
itself, is unreasonable conduct pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121.
Respondents have addressed this argument relating to whether certain conduct of counsel,
or of the party, constitutes unreasonable conduct, when it may regard a "misperception of the
law" or what may be "one's interest under the law". They raise the initial inquiry to the effect
that Idaho case law does not specifically define "whose" perception it is that is in question, and
the law does not state or define whether the issue is one regarding that conduct attributable to the
attorney for the Plaintiff, or that of the Plaintiff-client. That raises an interesting debate, as there
is yet a third possibility: that of the presiding judge, who has taken the bench with a duty that is
required to apply the rules of civil procedure so as to administer justice, to the end that
controversies are resolved upon the merits, not suffer a dismissal of the case when an amendment
is available to cure the defect that has become raised or addressed in the proceedings that relates
to the form of the pleading. These Respondents would conclude that the conduct in question, in
this case, should be considered to be that of the attorney, because Victoria had died three months
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earlier, and the matter must therefore be regarded to be the conduct of the attorney, who made
the decision to file the Complaint in the manner in which it was filed in this controversy, and it
would be that conduct that is then to be the focus of attention in this matter. Appellant would
submit the misperception of the law may rest with the district court as well, if misperceptions are
to be a focus in this appeal.

It is true that counsel, Vernon K. Smith, filed the Complaint, and was that attorney that
decided to identify the parties in their capacities and relationships that served to preserve "their
capacity as it existed when the contractual transaction came into being". Is that approach wrong?
The POA was valid, lawful, enforceable and binding with respect to the capability of those
parties when the transaction when created, so nothing is compromised or lost as to the
enforceability of the transaction; the subsequent death of the grantor of that POA does not
impact the validity of the contractual duties and obligations created in 2007-2008; the only issue,
if any, that could come into being after the death of Victoria would become who shall proceed to
prosecute the civil action to completion upon the merits of the valid claim that was created by
these parties, in their capacities as they then existed. Mr. Tolmie was an agent of TVS; Vernon
was an agent of Victoria: the transaction was entered into by Vernon, using his POA given to
him by Victoria, as she owned the property upon which the lima beans were being grown, and it
was her property that Mr. Tolme committed to perform his field representative duties during the
2007-2008 growing seasons. To disclose those existing and lawful relationships, upon which this
contractual relationship was formed, is neither misleading, unlawful, nor is it altogether
wrongful, as it was truthful in all respects in the presentation within the caption of the case, as
the intent was to state the cause of action, announce the history of the transaction, describe the
contractual relationship( s), between the parties at the time of the contractual transaction as it had
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existed, and confirm the obligation outstanding, and the obligation was still owing for the
performance and payment from the Defendants.

The issue that could be raised, if it were to become any concern to the prosecution of the
case, is the name of the party, or heir, or representative, to whom the outstanding obligation is to
be prosecuted, and that was a matter that could be addressed, should it became of any legitimate
inquiry or concern, as the liability of the Defendants was not extinguished merely because of the
death of Victoria, and these Defendants understood that fact, as they were making false claims
for bean storage and other nefarious assertions and furthermore, given the historical background
of Defendants' counsel, he knew the issue could be appropriately addressed and corrected by
substitution through amendment as to whom was then to become the real party in interest, acting
in behalf of the decedent, to proceed with the prosecution of the claim upon the merits of the
controversy.

There exists no dispute that the attorney-in-fact, Vernon K. Smith, was acting for his
Mother when the transaction was entered into in the 2007-2008 time period; there is no dispute
the attorney-at-law, Vernon K. Smith, was acting for his Mother's interests (and her transferee or
heir-beneficiary) at the time of filing the Complaint, whose interests are either represented by her
son, Vernon K. Smith, who was her heir to receive her entire bequeath, or VHS Properties, LLC,
of which they were both members until Vernon became the remaining active member in 2013,
and that entity had received all properties and interests of Victoria, through transfer, in 2012. An
Estate was not opened because of the transfer, but if it thought necessary or required, to
undertake the formation of an estate, any one of which substitutions were available to further
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prosecute the action to completion, as the Rules specifically allow such alterations to pleadings
and substitutions of parties under the law.

There was no agenda to conceal Victoria's death, as it was common knowledge, and was
never raised as an issue by either of the Defendants, and if that be because their counsel was not
aware of Victoria's death, then he was about the only person in the Treasure Valley who was uninformed. The Court was aware of her death, and it was the Court that undertook the initiative to
raise the issue, and became the moving force to seek dismissal of the action, without proper
allowance to address the allowable substitution of a named party or parties to proceed in the
litigation. It was never a question that somehow the death had eliminated the claim, or that
crucial testimony was now unavailable from a decedent; Vernon K. Smith was the one to engage
all conversation and familiar with all aspects of the transaction, acting at the time in behalf of his
Mother, who then died on September 11, 2013, 50 days short of 100 years of age. The was no
harm or deception in providing for continuity in the disclosure of the capacity that historically
reflected the relationships of the parties at the time the transaction was undertaken; that is was
Vernon K. Smith, acting as the attorney-in-fact for his Mother, when the relationship(s) were
created and the transaction undertaken; there was no surprise from any of the pleading content,
or from the attachments to the pleadings, and there was no surprise that Vernon K. Smith was the
individual who conducted all of the negotiations that were undertaken, and Victoria would not
need to testify or be mentioned at all. The objective being served was to provide disclosure of
what the relationships were, and the contract obligation existing, and if an issue arose as to the
party to continue the prosecution of the action, the appropriate amendment could and would have
been made.
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The procedural provisions under the Rules allow for just such amendments, if and when
needed, are clearly well settled how that is to be accomplished under the provisions of Rules 15,
17, and 20, IRCP, which are to be liberally construed by any presiding district court judge, and
all parties are to be afforded the right for amendment to resolve issues to address who will be or
become the real parties in interest, and the Complaint is not to be dismissed when a remedy is

available through an amendment, so as to allow the matter to proceed upon the merits. These
Civil Rules provide sufficient clarity to the prohibition of dismissing a Complaint when the
concerns of a parties' interest becomes an issue, and it can be remedied with an amendment.
Appellant would again cite the Rule that sufficiently addresses this point, and if the law was
misperceived, it was not due to a failure of prior reliance on that long established pleading rule,
but instead upon what appears to have been a perception of the application of that Rule by the
presiding district court judge. Again, but not to belabor the point, the Rule specifically states:

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 17(a). Real Party in Interest.
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An executor,
administrator, personal representative, guardian, conservator, bailee, trustee of an express trusti.J!
party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the beneflt of another, or a
party authorized by statute may sue in this capacity without joining the party for whose benefit
the action is brought; and when a statute of the state ofldaho so provides, an action for the use or
benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of Idaho. No action shall he
dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until
a reasonable time has been allowed after ohiection for ratification of commencement of the
action hv. or ioinder or substitution of. the real party in interest; and such ratification, ioinder,
or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of
the real party in interest. (Emphasis added)

That Rule would appear to have allowed the Complaint to have been filed as it was filed,
as "the Party, in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another" was being
revealed, preserved, and identified in the caption, and the fact Victoria had died was known to
the public, and if an issue was being raised, it could be corrected with the amendment that is
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allowed to be made under the procedural rules, and the action would be allowed to proceed upon
the merits, and not be dismissed by any presiding judge because of it.

If the application of the law was not misperceived as to how it was being treated or regarded
by the presiding judge, the requested amendment would have been made, and there would have
never been this controversy over §12-121, Idaho Code, attorney fees. As before stated in the
Opening Brief, virtually every case that is controlled by a question oflaw would otherwise entail an
attorney fee award against the losing party under §12-121, if the element of someone's
misperception of the law is not also taken into consideration. The issue of a real party in interest had
become raised, and Rule l 7(a) addresses how that is to be resolved. From Appellants perspective,
the District Court failed to apply the Rule correctly, and furthermore, by failing to apply it in a
fashion that prevents dismissal of the case, rather than causing dismissal of the case, it would
appear the district court has violated the Rule, as the Court dismissed the case when specifically
precluded from doing so, without first giving reasonable opportunity to substitute a real party in
interest, of which several alternatives were available for consideration,, including the individual
who came to hold and control all interests of a proper Party Plaintiff, either individually, who held
an interest also in the beans, or as an agent of VHS Properties, or as a personal representative in an
estate to be opened, or as a member of the LLC that came to hold the interests by the transfers
made in 2012. A proper substitution could have, and would have been made, if allowed, and that
factor as to the misperception of the law by the district court judge does not constitute a basis for
entry of a fee award as a consequence of seeking the proper substitution under the Rules.

As stated previously, the entire course o{the litigation must be taken into account. See

Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 434, 95 P.3d 34, 52 (2004); McGrew, 139
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Idaho at 562, 82 P.3d at 844. (emphasis added). If there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact,
then attorney fees may not be awarded under §12-121, Idaho Code, even though the losing party
has asserted factual or legal claims that may be or in fact are frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation. Clearly there was a legitimate and triable issue of fact in this case. Again see
Vendelin, 140 Idaho at 434, 95 P.3d at 52; Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist., 135 Idaho at 524-25, 20

P.3d at 708-09. 142 Idaho at 539, 129 P.3d at 1288 ( emphasis added). If there is one legitimate
issue that was presented in the case, then attorney fees cannot be awarded under §12-121, Idaho
Code, even though the losing party may have asserted other factual or legal claims that are

allegedly frivolous, unreasonable, or without adequate legal or factual foundation. See McGrew
v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 562, 82 P.3d 833, 844 (2003). This case was never allowed to go to

the facts of the case because the amendment was not allowed. There are no written findings to
reflect the reasons of the district court, but only the oral dialogue allows us to visualize the basis
for the attorney fee award, and it was because of the caption of the case, and the failure to allow
the amendment is a reflection of an abuse of discretion and violation of the Rules of Procedure
on the subject of addressing the real party(s) in interest. When such written findings are to be
made, they must be supported by the record that upholds the court's determination that the entire
action was pursued frivolously. Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 799, 41 P.3d 220,
227 (2001). No action was allowed to be pursued by the real party or parties in interest, as the
Court truncated the intent of the Rules that specifically prohibited a dismissal, and made the
decision to dismiss the action, without affording the reasonable and necessary opportunity to
determine the method of substitution.
Respondents' position is that "Mr. Smith's misperception of the law was unreasonable
and without foundation" (Resp. Brief, Argument B, pg. 13). If it be stated that the situation was
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created by Mr. Smith, that brought into focus the need to consider an amendment to the
pleadings, then that would serve to be a true statement. To say or suggest that the pleadings
constitute such a violation of the law, as to merit a dismissal of the case and an award of attorney
fees, we must take issue with that position, as the district court had the procedural means to
correct the real party in interest issue that was being asserted by the court, and a proper
application of the available procedural means, through a correct application and proper
perception of the procedural rules in the law would have resolved the matter, and the controversy
would have proceeded to the merits of the case, as the Supreme Court has announced the intent
of the civil rules does specifically seeks to accomplish.

4. Whether the entire course of litigation must be considered in an award of
attorney's fees pursuant to §12-121, Idaho Code, so that any legitimate, triable issue
of fact will prevent an award of attorney's fees.
The Respondents take issue with the argument that regards the idea the entire course of
litigation must be considered before any award of attorney fees can be made, pursuant to § 12121, Idaho Code, suggesting that the deceased never presented any triable issue of fact. (Resp.
Brief, Argument C, pg. 16). This concept present by Respondents would serve to suggest that the
Nullity Rule should be applied, and the procedural amendments that are required to be liberally

afforded to be allowed and to take place under Rules 15, 17, and 20, IRCP, are now to be
disregarded and shall not to be applied in this case. As stated in the Trimble, case, supra, the
Nullity Rule has not been adopted in Idaho, as it violates the spirit and intent of the procedural
rules adopted in Idaho. To repeat what the Trimble case stated:
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"Idaho has not adopted the nullity theory, and we see no good reason to do so now. The
nullity rule is a remnant of an earlier era of strict pleading requirements. Adopting such a rule,
and thereby precluding amendment and relation back where a party is improperly named, would
frustrate the purpose of our modern rules of pleading which seek to promote the resolution of
disputes on their merits rather than to bar suit based on antiquated pleading requirements. See
IR. C.P. I (a) ("These rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding. The courts can resolve more fairly problems
stemming from improperly named defendants by applying I.R.C.P. 15(c). We thus decline to
adopt the nullity rule in Idaho and hold that, where a party has been named improperly,
amendment and relation back should he allowed where the requirements o(LR.C.P. 15(c) are
met ..... (emphasis, both italicized and dark, added)
We could not proceed to the "triable issues of fact" since the district court elected to
dismiss the case instead of allowing a reasonable amendment to be made to identify the real
parties in interest, once the expressed concern was made, and thereby allow the controversy to be
tried upon the merits, as the procedural rules require to be achieved, and as the Trimble case has
so instructed the lower courts to accomplish.

5. Respondents Are Not Entitled To An Award Of Attorney's Fees In This Appeal
It would appear from Par 3, pg. 19, of Respondents' Brief that TVS has withdrawn their

cross-appeal before filed by Respondents, the effect of which was their initial intent to pursue
attorney fees on appeal, pursuant to §12-120(3), Idaho Code, and Rule ll(a)(l), IRCP. That
issue has now been removed from this appeal, and no such fees, under those provisions, are
being requested by Respondents. Appellants have no objection to their cross-appeal being
withdrawn at this time. Respondents, however, (Resp. Brief, pg. 9) claim they are seeking
attorney fees, against counsel for the decedent, under §12-121, Idaho Code, and Rule 54(e)(l),
IRCP., claiming this appeal is frivolous, umeasonable and being brought without foundation.
The Respondents have presented no specific argument for that award on appeal, but rather have
chosen to incorporate the argument presented within their Responsive Brief to support the
award of attorney fees that was made by the lower court, when dismissing the case because of
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the caption in the Complaint. Respondents' request for fees and argument for fees on appeal, is
actually presented in three sentences only, contained on pg. 9 of their Responsive Brief, under
the heading: "Attorney Fees on Appeal". The "argument" being made for attorney fees on
appeal merely seeks to incorporate the recitation of their argument asserted within the Brief to
support the award by the lower court, and that "argument" merely references what is being stated
throughout the Brief, as embraced within their statement: "as explained at length below" (see
Resp. Brief, pg. 9,

2nd

Par.). All that is presented "below" is Respondents' argument regarding

the lower court's decision, and does not serve to present any argument to support any award of
attorney fees as a result of this appeal.

Since Respondents refer to argument "as explained at length below" as the basis for fees
on appeal, then we come to the part that discloses Respondents' awareness and concern over the
fact no written findings have been made and entered by the district court, regarding the basis
and reasons for granting the attorney fees as the lower court did, how does that support attorney
fees on appeal? A violation of a critical procedural rule that mandates written findings when
awarding attorney fees under §12-121, Idaho Code, does not support their claim. That
obligation is not discretionary or subject to assignment, or allowed to be substituted by an oral
dissertation in open court, and is specifically required when an award of attorney fees is being
made under §12-121, Idaho Code, as required by Rule 54(e)(2), IRCP. Having recognized that
procedural error, Respondents want to instead "create new case law", or remand the matter for
such entry of written findings. That acknowledgment of this procedural error below doesn't
demonstrate much basis to argue this appeal is "frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation".
It appears to validate the appeal. If remand is undertaken as part of the Decision, it should be one
that serves to vacate the award of the attorney fees by the 10\ver court, and vacate the judgment
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that was entered in that regard, not take any occasion to discard a 36 year old procedural
requirement under the rules of civil procedure, or undertake to make new case law that conflicts
with the existing rule as written and adopted by the Supreme Court in 1979. Not only has there
been no authority cited for "creating this new case law", there has been no specific argument set
forth to advance a basis to award any attorney fees on appeal. Do references, by incorporation, to
aspects of general arguments presented to address a lower court's award of attorney fees in a
Responsive Brief, serve to become adequate and appropriate argument to support a request for an
award of fees on appeal? Now that may be what could constitute "new case law"
Arguments which are not raised in a party's initial brief, supported by relevant
legal citation, cannot be raised for the first time at an oral argument. Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho
372, 374, 234 P.3d 696, 698 (2010); and Morgan v. Sexual Offender Classification Board, 148
Idaho 196,199,220 P.3d 314,317 (2009).

Any request for attorney fees must be supported by argument and authority.

Mere

citations to statutes and rules that authorize fees, without more, has been held by this Court to be
insufficient. Carroll v. MBNA America Bank, 148 Idaho 261, 270, 220 P.3d 1080, 1089 (2009).
Even some argument with citation to a supporting statutory or contractual basis is insufficient.
See Athay v. Stacey, 146 Idaho 407,422, 196 P.3d 325,340 (2008)
Respondents have chosen to provide argument by incorporation, though it relates solely
to the lower court's award, and no specific authority or argument that addresses the merits of this
appeal. There is no argument submitted to support their citation to the statutory and rule
reference on pg. 9 of their Brief, from which to make any reply to any specific argument they
make to support any request for attorney fees on appeal, and for lack of any specific argument,
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their request for attorney's fees should be summarily denied. Furthermore, Appellants
fundamentally disagree with Respondents' general argument regarding the lower court's award,
and certainly take issue with any suggestion or assertion this appeal is frivolous, unreasonable, or
brought without foundation, as it remains apparent the lower court's award of fees stems from
the disregard and a clear violation of Rules 15, 17, and 20, IRCP, as argued extensively above, as
Appellants were denied a right to pursue a remedy and recovery upon a contractual transaction,
stemming from the district court failing to allow an amendment to be made to the caption of the
case.
CONCLUSION

This case should be remanded to the District Court, with instructions to vacate the
judgment of August 28, 2014 that awarded attorney fees and costs to the Defendants. To allow
the judgment to stand serves only to add insult to the injury that Plaintiff-Appellant is unable to
redress a valid and meritorious claim against these Defendants, who refuse to return the beans
they haven't paid for as required under the agreement, and seek to appropriate the beans by
taking advantage of the death of Victoria H. Smith andthe·passage of time.
/ / / ,.~r

Respectfully submitted this 26TH day

Attorney for Appellants
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